Public Bill Committee

[Frank Cook in the Chair]

Clause 11

Advice and research functions of the Consumer Panel

Amendment proposed [this day]: No. 222, in clause 11, page 5, line 10, after ‘Board’, insert ‘or on its own initiative’.—[Mr. Djanogly.]

Question again proposed, That the amendment be made.

Frank Cook: I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following amendment:No. 223, in clause 11, page 5, line 16, at end add—
‘(4) In acting on its own initiative under subsection (1), the Consumer Panel shall not impose any costs on any of the approved regulators.’.

Jonathan Djanogly: My hon. Friend the Member for North-West Norfolk made the valid point that the commitment set out in the amendment should not become open-ended. I totally agree with that, and it is a point that we tried to address in the second of our amendments in the group. The Minister also picked up on that point, in a rather dismissive way, I thought. She dismissed our efforts to reduce the exposure, by saying, “Well, even if you put that in place it still wouldn’t work”. To be frank, it is true that the amendment might not be enough, but we were trying to make the point that just because the original amendment would need to be limited, that does not mean that the thought behind it was wrong. We simply need to look at the issue in a more constructive way.
The hon. Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey said the measure was standard practice in other bodies, and the Minister disputed that. I think that she gave the example of Ofcom. Having the advantage of the break, I thought that I would have a quick look at the provisions for Ofcom, which are quite interesting. Section 16(6) of the CommunicationsAct 2003 states:
“The arrangements made by OFCOM under this section must also secure that the Consumer Panel are able, in addition to giving advice on the matters mentioned in subsection (3), to do each of the following—
(a) at the request of OFCOM, to carry out research for OFCOM in relation to any of the matters in relation to which OFCOM have functions under section 14”.
That obviously is similar to what is in the Bill. However, section 16(6)(b) says
 “to make arrangements for the carrying out of research into such other matters appearing to the Panel to be relevant to the carrying out of the Panel’s functions as they think fit”.

Bridget Prentice: I absolutely agree with the hon. Gentleman. I, too, have had some research done during the break, and he is quite right. I inadvertently misled the Committee by quoting section 16(3) of the 2003 Act, when in fact, as he rightly points out, section 16(6)(b) allows the Ofcom consumer panel to carry out research into matters that it perceives as relevant to its work. Of course, the consumer panel also has a memorandum of understanding with Ofcom regarding the scope of the panel’s research, which it set out at the beginning of its year. On that basis, I am happy to put the record straight on that aspect of the debate.

Jonathan Djanogly: I thank the Minister for that clarification, but it means that we have established that there is precedence in other regulatory systems for the amendment that we are suggesting. The hon. Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey was rightto bring the matter up. What is suggested by the amendment is not unusual and it exists elsewhere. The amendment is rational and makes sense, but we have concerns about cost and the other issues that the Minister mentioned.

John Hemming: On cost, the same briefing from the National Consumer Council makes the point that Ofcom has a budget for the consumer panel to handle matters, so its costs are to that extent controlled. That makes amendmentNo. 223 potentially otiose.

Jonathan Djanogly: That is not necessarily the case, because the money would otherwise come from practitioners in such circumstances. However, I appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s point, in so far as the issue would need to be looked at again, and there is existing precedence for the process working in other scenarios. As a way of going forward, therefore, the measure should be looked at instead of simply being dismissed, as the Minister did earlier.
On that basis, we would like the Minister to look at the issue again. She has come back to it once, and perhaps she will return to it again when she has more time. Therefore, in order to allow it to be looked at again, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Jonathan Djanogly: I beg to move amendment No. 224, in clause 11, page 5, line 16, at end add—
‘(4) It shall be the duty of the Board (subject to subsection (5))—
(a) to provide the Consumer Panel with all such information as, having regard, in particular to the need to preserve commercial confidentiality, the Board considers appropriate to disclose to the Panel for the purpose of enabling the Panel to carry out their functions; and
(b) to provide the Panel with all such further information as the Panel may require.
(5) The Board is not required to provide information by virtue of subsection (4)(b) if, having regard to—
(a) the need to preserve commercial confidentiality, and
(b) any other matters that appear to the Board to be relevant,
it is reasonable for the Board to refuse to disclose it to the Panel.’
This amendment again comes from the National Consumer Council, and we have tabled it on a probing basis. It would work alongside amendment No. 222 by ensuring that the consumer panel has access to the information that it needs to carry out its functions—information held by the board, subject to appropriate restrictions. Just as an individual needs the appropriate resources in order to do their work, so the consumer panel requires access to certain information in orderto carry out its work to the highest possible level. However, the amendment also recognises that there may be some instances in which it may not be appropriate for the consumer panel to receive such information. Therefore, the amendment would give the Legal Services Board the discretion to decide on such cases.

John Mann: “Commercial confidentiality” is a term that I have heard quoted a lot in the context of this Bill, and it has been quoted to me in numerous cases. One of the big issues is that individual members of the public, who, for example, wonder whether to make complaints against solicitors, often struggle to get hold of their files from the solicitors. Another example could be that of a coal miner—someone who knows nothing about the law, has never had to deal with the law and is not an expert on compensation schemes, but who nevertheless wants to know whether their case has been handled properly. He might like his Member of Parliament to take a look at his file to see whether the services aspect of the claim has been put in.
The services aspect of the claim can be three, four or five times the amount of the rest of the claim, so this is not a small issue. However, only someone with the relevant knowledge would be able to identify whether or not the case contained a potential services claim that had not been applied for. That information can only be found by looking at the file. However, certain solicitors refuse to hand over those files, and at the moment, self-regulation appears powerless to do much about that. Where is access to justice in relation to that?
Some paperwork has been refused on the basis of client confidentiality. Let us take the example of a contractual arrangement between a claims handling company and a solicitor that the individual concerned does not know about it. How can that individual make a rational decision about whether they have a justified complaint, if “commercial confidentiality” is cited as a reason not to give copies of the information?
Let us take a more generic case, because this is exactly the kind of issue that the panel should look at. Let us say that an industrial injury claim is given to a legal executive who has no great experience and no precise knowledge of the law, and who routinely gives that work to a barrister, who examines it in the same way that a member of the Committee might and writes a short report in 10 minutes, spelling out what is a straightforward case. The barrister sends it back and charges the solicitor’s company, which passes it on to the individual. The individual can do nothing about that, but how does he know what transactions took place, to enable him to make a complaint and say that he had been hoodwinked because the issue did not require a barrister? A barrister was used only because, unbeknown to the individual, the solicitor had passed the papers to an executive, not a solicitor. The paper trail required can therefore be deemed to be commercially confidential.
For the consumer panel or the Legal Services Board to know whether the transaction had been done routinely, it would need access to what clearly could be described as commercially confidential documents, such as those relating to the financial relationship between the solicitor and the barrister or, say, a solicitor and a medical handling company. The solicitor might have just happened to set up such a company, passed the medical case through it and taken a cut of the money. Moreover, as we have seen inmany cases, such a relationship might be with a loans company that is giving out large loans for legal expenses and receiving good commission. The case might be shared around. Many such issues might be deemed worthy of examination by the consumer panel or the board.
The restriction of confidentiality in such matters is absurd. It means that the very issues that need exploring will not be explored. While it is a slight point, given some of the amendment’s aims, it masks a greater sin, which is the ability of the consumer or the individual to receive redress. More important is the consistent ability to look at the overall system and advise the board—and perhaps Ministers—of the law and weaknesses within the system that have been legally but, in some eyes, immorally exploited by those in the legal profession. Hiding behind commercial confidentiality has been the precise tactic used by particularly wealthy solicitors who have benefited from their interpretation of the rules in such claims.

Simon Hughes: My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley and I both support the amendment because it has merit. I had not intended to say much more than that, but I have now been prompted to do so because the hon. Member for Bassetlaw has made a good point. I completely understand the concern that, if the conventional phrase is put into legislation that states that it shall be the duty of the board
“to provide the Consumer Panel with all such information as, having regard, in particular to the need to preserve commercial confidentiality”,
it will bring about an undefined and potentially broad exemption.
I spend much of my time wondering why so much local government information is secret. The most common reason given is that something is commercially confidential. We could be talking about the largest piece of publicly owned land in our constituencies and the generally held view that members of the public, their councillors and their Member of Parliament should know what is going on, but then be told that it was not something for whichwe could see the paperwork. I agree with the hon. Gentleman in that, if we were to have such a good proposal and if there were to be limits, there would have to be a clear definition of the limits.
The Minister might be able to answer, either now or later, a question asked in that regard. I am not sure whether this is dealt with later in the Bill, because I have not checked. Does the Bill addresses the question of commercial confidentiality? The convention exists that when you, Mr. Cook, the Minister or I employor engage a solicitor’s firm, the relationship is confidential, unless it comes out into the open because we take action against another party or because the matter goes to court. That is right and proper.
The proposal is a good one. I understand the point about not wanting to make it effectively useless by making the exemptions so big. Perhaps the Minister could help us by deliberating on that. The hon. Member for Huntingdon and his colleagues, and my colleagues and I, could deal with any issues that need addressing.

John Hemming: I rise to support what the hon. Member for Bassetlaw has said. There is an issue about the transparency of payments, but, in practice, the amendment would start by giving a duty to provide some information to the consumer panel. Without such a provision, there would be no duty to provide it with any information. The transparency of payments is clearly an important point, but it is not necessarily part of this.

Henry Bellingham: The amendment would place a duty on the Legal Services Board to provide information. Surely that would be a great deal better than the clause, as drafted. As the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley pointed out, there is no obligation or duty on the board to provide any information. That is why clause 11 is deficient. It states:
“The Consumer Panel may, at the request of the Board”.
It continues:
“The Board must consider any advice given... The Consumer Panel may publish such information as it thinks fit about advice it gives”.
There is no duty on the board to provide information.
I take on board the point made by the hon. Member for Bassetlaw. In our enthusiasm to widen the scope of the clause and to ensure that provision was made for such a duty, we decided that we would be cautious, which is why we included the qualification about preserving commercial confidentiality. Surely he would agree that amendment No. 224 would improve the clause, despite his concerns about the commercial confidentiality qualification. I notice that he did not table an amendment to improve the clause further, in a way that he would find more powerful and effective than our proposal.
We are trying to sing from the same hymn sheet, because we are trying to give the consumer panel much more power, influence, focus and direction. We hope that it will therefore attract large numbers of high-calibre people to serve on it. In the light of the Committee’s debate, I hope that the Minister will look sympathetically at our proposal.

Bridget Prentice: Being the magnanimous person that I am, I agree that the consumer panel should have all the information that it needs to carry out its functions. The amendment clearly seeks to allow it to make requests in that regard. It is important to recognise that clause 10 already enables it to do so, simply by making representations to the board, which would be obliged to consider them. It is likely thatthe board and the consumer panel could agree a framework, not unlike the memorandum of understanding between Ofcom and its panel. I have made reference to that arrangement.

John Hemming: Looking particularly at clause 10, it seems that the Legal Services Board will be more likely to know what information may be necessary for the consumer panel. If the consumer panel does not know that some information is necessary, it cannot ask forit. That is why the duty to provide information is stronger than a situation where the panel can ask for information and be told that it cannot have it.

Bridget Prentice: I understand the hon. Gentleman and take that point, which is why I shall be quite positive in my response to the amendment. I wish to put on record that it should be clear from the very fact that we are establishing a consumer panel that we want it to be furnished with the information that it needs.It is fundamental that the organisation that makes representations to, and consults with, the board conducts research, gives advice as requested and receives the information that it requires. How else could it achieve the aims that we have set out? However,I have a couple of niggling concerns about the amendment; I am not entirely convinced that it will achieve what hon. Members want. I ask the hon. Member for Huntingdon to withdraw the amendment on the basis that I will positively consider the matter to find out whether we can come to some arrangement.
My hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw rightly highlights at every opportunity some of the scandalous practices that have taken place as regards some of our constituents. On access to information, a client should be entitled to the file that relates to their case. Under the Bill, if they are not satisfied with the service provided by a lawyer, they can go to the Office for Legal Complaints. The ombudsman will have the power to require a party to a complaint to provide all the documents and information necessary to consider it, which is a wide-ranging power. I shall discuss the amendment further with consumer groups and other stakeholders to ensure that we achieve exactly the hon. Members’ aims.

Jonathan Djanogly: The Minister’s response has been heartening, and we understand her wish to consult further on the final product, not least in light of the valid comments made by the hon. Members for Bassetlaw and for North Southwark and Bermondsey on the definitions and breadth of the exceptions, the transparency of payments and the need to define clear limitations. I hope that those points will be teased out in the days to come. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Henry Bellingham: I remind the Minister that, during the discussion on amendment No. 222, I suggested that various outside organisations and consumer bodies, such as Which? and the NCC, might possibly provide research material to the consumer panel. The panel will carry out a number of major projects, and we want it to have a wide range. A consumer group might be involved already in a major campaign that involves informing its membership, with articles in a publication or surveys and questionnaires.
Such campaigns might be on all fours with a consumer panel initiative, and it would be sensible if the two initiatives could be brought together. Will the Minister tell the Committee whether she sees any merit in such an approach and whether she is attracted to my suggestions? The clause stand part debate is the time to look into the matter in more detail. I should be most grateful to the Minister if she gave me some indication of her views.

Bridget Prentice: I am very sympathetic with the hon. Gentleman’s suggestion. The clause will enable the consumer panel to carry out research and give advice to the board, following a board request, and any opportunity for the panel to pick up on good research should be welcomed. I am not in favour of reinventing the wheel. If certain consumer organisations were doing research, therefore, it would be foolish for the consumer panel not to be able to access it. I shall consider whether there are ways in which we can provide encouragement for the hon. Gentleman’s suggestion.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 11 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 12

Meaning of “reserved legal activity” and “legal activity”

Jonathan Djanogly: I beg to move amendment No. 210,in clause 12, page 5, line 26, at end insert—‘(ea) preparation of wills’.
We have now moved on to part 3 of the Bill, which deals with reserved legal activities, as defined by the clause. The Opposition propose that the writing of wills should be included in the list of reserved legal activities that may only be carried on by authorised persons. The clause identifies six forms of legal activity that will be regulated as reserved legal activities: the exercise of a right of audience in the courts, the conduct of litigation, reserved instrument activities, probate activities, notarial activities and the administration of oaths.
This probing amendment is intended to prompt the consideration of whether will preparation should be added to that list, as recommended by the Joint Committee on the Draft Legal Services Bill, which said:
“We note that the offences in clause...12 will apply to a range of situations where consumers may need protection... We recommend that will-writing for fee, gain or reward should be included within the new regulatory framework. The draft Bill should be amended to provide for regulation subject to any exemptions necessary in the consumer interest.”
The Joint Committee noted that there is no existing regulatory framework for will writing or existing professional body with responsibility for will writing. Accordingly, there is a significant risk of consumer detriment from the activities of unregulated will writers. The Government identified a similar risk in relation to the claims management sector in the context of the Compensation Act 2006. In that case, they wanted
“A major change in quality and behaviour by claims management companies so that the service provided to consumers is significantly improved and consumers’ expectations are not falsely raised through potentially misleading advertising and other sales practices”.
Some bodies, including the Law Society, consider that the same changes and developments should occur in relation to will writing. In fairness, it is arguable that there are differences between writing wills, which relate to only one person, and complex litigation. For most people, an off-the-shelf, do-it-yourself will, purchased from a high street shop, would probably be perfectly adequate.
I should like the Minister to tell us whether the Government have conducted any research on the issue. In particular, would extra regulation be likely to reduce the number of people making wills? That is a key issue, because too many people currently do not make a will, and we should encourage, rather than discourage, will making. The Government have already made clear that they wish to increase consumer protection by bringing will writers into the scope of the regulatory framework.

Kevan Jones: The hon. Gentleman referred to claims handling companies—a type of organisation that, frankly, I would outlaw altogether. Those organisations are now covered by the Compensation Act 2006. If they were offering will services, would not those activities be covered by their regulator?

Jonathan Djanogly: I am not sure what the hon. Gentleman is trying to say. Is he saying that, if claims handling companies offered will making services, they would be regulated?

Kevan Jones: I am suggesting that those activities are already covered by the Compensation Act 2006, which regulates claims handling companies.

Jonathan Djanogly: I do not think that that is the case; I do not think that will drafting is regulated in any way whatever.
To conclude, my concern is that, if there were regulation, far fewer people might make a will. Most wills are pretty straightforward documents; it is when complexity comes into will making that the possibility of mistakes increases. That is the potential problem area, and I shall certainly be interested to hear the Minister’s views.

John Mann: I am a little confused by the hon. Gentleman’s speech, because he appeared to argue against his amendment at the end. To quote the helpful explanation under the new Bill system, of which I thoroughly approve, the Members’ explanatory statement for the amendment says:
“To add will-writing to the list of reserved legal activities which can only be carried out by authorised persons.”
When members of the Transport Salaried Staffs Association wish to participate in debates on transport, they must exclude themselves from the deliberations, because they are deemed to have a vested advocacy interest. There are other such examples.
The Chairman of the Select Committee on Standards and Privileges clarified the issue precisely on 14 May 2002, Official Report,columns 731-750. I shall quote only the relevant line, which says that
“from now on the only restriction on Members’ freedom of action will be that they must not seek to confer benefit exclusively on a body in which they have a pecuniary interest.”— [Official Report, 14 May 2002; Vol. 385, c. 732.]
I vary from Parliament’s view, because I do not believe that any restriction is sensible. Transparency is the principle, but the issue prompts an interesting question of Members.
The amendment would confer a benefit exclusively on a set profession: it would be the only profession that could benefit from that work, and it would do so exclusively. Should a practising solicitor who is a Member of the House wish to vote on the amendment, it could be argued that their company would benefit and that, either indirectly through the profits of their company or directly through their own work, they would benefit.
This is a good juncture at which to explore the issue of advocacy. I do not wish to see anyone excluding themselves from any votes here, but this is as precise an example as it is possible to get. The benefit would be exclusively to the said profession, as outlined very helpfully in the Members’ explanatory statement; that is what this provision would do. It could not be argued that voting against it would confer an exclusive benefit, but voting for it could.
I merely make the observation that should Members proceed on that basis, it would set a precedent—possibly very helpful—for the limits on advocacy and the Nolan principles. I would regard that as very sensible. Some of the nonsense in the past, such as TSSA members being excluded from a Committee because of their membership of that organisation, was ludicrous, but that is what happened.

Kevan Jones: May I offer my hon. Friend an example from local government? I was on a planning committee once, and because a number of people on it were season ticket holders of a well known north-east football club, they could not take part in the decision.

John Mann: The balance, as Parliament determines it, is skewed towards preventing people from doing things, rather than towards transparency. The key principle is transparency, and one’s judge is one’s voters. As long as there is transparency, the voters will be the final arbiters of anyone’s behaviour. That is my view; it is not the view of the House, as determined on its behalf by the Standards and Privileges Committee.
The situation under discussion is a good exampleof conferring an exclusive benefit in which Members might have a pecuniary interest, so it is relevant, Mr. Cook, to make such observations at this time.
 Several hon. Members rose—

Frank Cook: Order. The Chair has been very tolerant of the discussions so far, and I commend hon. Members for the diligent manner in which they are applying their attention and focus to the quality of the debate, but we cannot entertain a wide-ranging debate on the House’s rules on advocacy. If the hon. Member for Bassetlaw wants to raise that issue, the House has other more appropriate ways in which that can be done. Although I commend hon. Members for their diligence and conscientious application to the broader issues, we must focus our attention on line-by-line scrutiny ofthe Bill.

Kevan Jones: On a point of order, Mr. Cook. I concur with my hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw. For example, at least one member of the Committee will potentially benefit from this clause. If we allow this matter to go through without a ruling before we get to the end of the Bill, questions could be asked about how we have scrutinised it.

Frank Cook: I have to remind the Committee once more, as I did on Tuesday, that this is a matter forthe Standards and Privileges Committee, not this Committee. If Members have a problem, they should consult the register, and if they still have a problem they should refer it to the Standards and Privileges Committee.

Simon Hughes: I shall return to the central purpose of this clear and important amendment. As the hon. Member for Huntingdon said, we are on to part 3 of nine as we rush on. We are doing well. It is another part that starts with a definition and comes to the statement later, just en passant.
Part 3 is about the regulation of legal activities and which legal activities are governed by the Bill. First, we define the reserved legal activity and legal activity in clause 12, and then the relevance of defining them appears first in clause 14, which sets out the proposition with which this part deals. That proposition is that if one carries out a certain activity, one has to be approved to do so and if one is not approved, it is an offence to carry it out. Clause 12 lists those activities, which are
“the exercise of a right of audience...the conduct of litigation...reserved instrument activities...probate activities... notarial activities...the administration of oaths.”
I shall come back to that list, but the obvious omission, which has been proposed for a long time, is the writing of wills. I have thought about the subject a lot, and I start from the position that we should not seek to regulate things unless we have to regulate. That is always my position in life. We have far too many laws and regulations, so I am not in favour of one more.
There are three generic ways in which a will can be written. First, people can write their own, and no one is suggesting that there should be any reduction in the number of people who do that, or control of them. Secondly, people go to a solicitor who has wills and probate as part of their advertised job. Many solicitors do wills as part of their business, and some have wills and probate as a key part of their business. Some generalist solicitors see wills, probate and conveyancing as their main, routine, run-of-the-mill work.
Thirdly, other people also do will writing. This debate is a bit like the one that we had on the Compensation Bill. We are talking about people about whom one would probably never have known until one day, a flyer came through the letterbox, there was an advert in the local paper, a leaflet was handed out atthe shopping centre or one was told about them. Alternatively, someone might give staff at an old people’s home information about local will writers. Bluntly, most people would not have a clue about who those people were or what competence and authority they had. That is a real concern. I want to cite some examples.

Stephen Hesford: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Simon Hughes: Of course I shall, but in a minute.
The Minister owned up—as I did and as others have done by implication—to the fact that there is a fourth category of people about whom we are concerned: those who have never addressed the question at all and have done niente about it. We all need to do better, especially if we are beyond our 20s and 30s and have family responsibilities, and other people depend on knowing what the score is.
Of course we should encourage people to write wills. That does not necessarily mean encouraging them to go to lawyers to do so. If the wills are simple, people can make them themselves; they could get the advisory pack from Woolworths or somewhere else. I am conscious that there is a campaign to have more will writing. I have owned up to the fact that I supported such a campaign, prompted by a firm in my constituency that produces the packs that provide such a service. I am sure that the firm offers that service,as well.

Stephen Hesford: In the Joint Committee that examined the draft Bill, I was persuaded by and attracted to an idea not dissimilar from the one behind the amendment—that wills should fall within this category. The Committee did not agree. I do not know what the Minister’s attitude is—
 Bridget Prentice indicated dissent.

Stephen Hesford: My hon. Friend shakes her head. However, I can see the argument; perhaps in the fullness of time I shall be able to vote for it, if the matter is pressed to a Division.

Simon Hughes: I am trying to be completely open about this issue, which involves a balance of judgment. In a minute, I shall give the reason why I think that the hon. Member for Wirral, West is right and why I hope that the Minister will concede the point.
I pick up where the hon. Gentleman left off. The Joint Committee examining the draft Bill said:
“We note that the Government concluded in its White Paper in respect of will writing that although there was no ‘compelling argument for statutory regulation’, that it was the Government's view that ‘improvements must be made in the control of quality and standards of will writing and related services in order to protect consumers’. We note the Government's conclusion that this could most effectively be achieved by voluntary regulation, codes of conduct and consumer education. We do not agree.”
The Joint Committee concluded that it did not agree with the Government’s view. In passing, I observe that, as I understand it, there is no power in this Bill for the Government to give guidance to the Legal Services Board, although I may be corrected. There is no power to add the desirable, as well as the statutorily necessary.
The Joint Committee also said:
“We recommend that will-writing for fee, gain or reward should be included within the new regulatory framework. The draft Bill should be amended to provide for regulation subject to any exemptions necessary in the consumer interest. We note that there is currently no existing regulatory framework for will-writing and no existing professional body with responsibility for will-writing activities. We note that these hurdles have been overcome in respect of the claims management sector, in the context of the Compensation Bill, and urge the Government to consider whether will-writers might be brought within the scope of the regulatory framework in a similar manner.”
The hon. Members for Bassetlaw and for North-West Durham—

Kevan Jones: North Durham.

Simon Hughes: I beg the hon. Gentleman’s pardon. Durham is a nice city in a nice county, although I am not sure about the constituency boundaries. During the Compensation Bill proceedings, both hon. Gentlemen argued that we should bring that group of activities within the law—and we have done so, courtesy of the Government. My current argument is similar, and I hope that the hon. Gentlemen find it attractive. I am not arguing at all that we should set up a separate profession of will writers; that is not my case. We need to debate whether all those different professions need to exist as such, and I shall come to that point in the clause stand part debate. I am concerned about thejob of will writing, rather than the professional occupation. It could reasonably be done by other people. One could go through a door marked “A variety of services”, and will writing could be one of them.
I want to give three examples of why the issue is important. In fact, my first point is not an example, but comes from my own experience. In the years of practice following my law degree, I found that interpreting wills was a fantastic source of work. Often, people’s wills do not reflect what they want them to reflect. If people get bad advice, they often do not write down—or it is not written down—what they wanted to happen.
As we all know, issues such as wills are greatly sensitive. Once someone dies and the will is looked at—not in the old-fashioned way when it is read out in front of all the prospective beneficiaries—the most terrible rows can ensue, because people think that they should have been included or that someone should have been excluded—first wives or first husbands. There are debates about when the will was written. There are also the issues connected with old people: have they been pressured into writing their will and who was there at the time?
All those issues make massive work for lawyers. They make even more work if they are not clear. Someone might write a will leaving everything to their daughter, which is clear and unarguable. That might happen without a will anyway if there is only one daughter. However, somebody may have six daughters. If they write “I leave everything to my daughter,” that would not be clear and a debate would be needed. There is a fantastic amount of debate out there. People often have to go to solicitors or to the courts. That causes great angst, trauma and family disharmony. Therefore, there is a real live issue out in the community.

John Mann: The hon. Gentleman makes quite a compelling case. Does he not accept that there is one caveat? Probate issues cause the most bitter rifts in mining communities. They are the most divisive of issues. The problem is usually to do with principle, rather than large amounts of money. One of the problems is not so much that wills are unclear, but that there is no will. Will the measure entice more people to make a will, or fewer?

Simon Hughes: Of course, that is an issue. I believe that we should encourage people to make a will. If people do not make wills, the law decides where their property goes. If they are married, their property goes to their husband or wife. I think that, if they havea civil partner, it goes to their civil partner. [ Interruption. ] If a Back Bencher says that that is not the case, I stand corrected. Certainly, if someone is married, their property goes to their husband or wife. If someone is single but has children, the property goes to the first generation. A statute deals with the administration of estates. It is not always terribly clear, but there is a law.
The hon. Gentleman was right when he said that it is hugely problematic if someone has not specified, or not specified clearly, what should happen to their property. We ought to be encouraging people to make wills and to make them as simple as possible.

Bob Neill: The only connection I have ever had with a will—apart from making one—was when I prosecuted someone for trying to forge one, which is not the issue now. I agree with the hon. Gentleman’s point. Does he agree that his point was reinforced by a debate in the other place? When difficult and intractable disputes occur over a badly drafted will, one of the problems is that, in a sense, it is too late. The person whose intention is in question is dead. Expensive litigation is the only means of rectification, which hits the person’s nearest and dearest. That is a compelling argument for regulation.

Simon Hughes: The legal case might be fine if one is dealing with the estate of rich Texan millionaires or billionaires and well-proportioned women 60 years their junior, and even their children. Bluntly, there is plenty of money floating around, so going to court to dispute who is to inherit the estate will not take a significant amount of it. However, that is not the case for lots of people. The smaller the income, the bigger the issue. A legal dispute can use up everything; everything can disappear.
The Law Society made a good general point in its briefing that gives me an introduction to my examples. We live in a society of changing family structures, and there are more categories of family. Families are more complex. There are single people, straightforwardly married people, cohabiting people, civil partners, people who are separated but still married, divorced people—sometimes living together, sometimes not—legitimate and illegitimate children and many step-families. I shall use that fact as a peg on which to hang my three examples.
I alluded to the first during the debate on Tuesday. The estimable nephew of mine whose birthday I said fell on the same day as that of the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate was very excited when I rang him up to tell him that his happy birthday would be featured in Hansard. Well, relatively excited; “very excited” is overstating things. He was intrigued and relatively excited. He married just over two years ago, and he and his wife have brought into the family a child of their own, as well as his child and her children from previous relationships. If his will said, “I leave these to my children” and did not specify, that self-evidently would not answer the question, because it would not say whether it meant his natural children or his wife’s children whom he took on.
I do not know what will happen. My nephew might never formally adopt or take legal responsibility for his wife’s children, who live with them in their joint home, but that is exactly the sort of issue about which bad advice, bluntly, could have exactly the wrong result. If, having written a will, he died and the will was not clear, a dispute could immediately arise between his natural children and those who became the children of the family, who by then might be married adults with children of their own.
The second example concerns a constituency case with which I am dealing at the moment. I am trying to sort out for a constituent, for the purposes of probate, some money from the sale of her elderly mother’s flat, which was sold when she became ill and incapable of running her own affairs and had to move into residential care. It is a common circumstance. Her daughter, one of two, was given power of attorney while the mother was still compos mentis enough to do so. She sold the flat and her mother moved into residential and other care, and subsequently died.
At the beginning, the daughter simply used the funds to pay for residential care and so on as necessary—topping up the care given, paying for an assessment—and she did not think to put that money into a separate account. She put it into her account, and eventually her bank said to her, “You ought to put it into a separate account to make it clear that it is the residuary amount from the sale of the flat.” She put it into a separate account, but an account in her name. Nobody had said to her that she ought to put it into an account for her mother, so she just opened an additional bank account in her name.
Then her mother died and she was very busy dealing with the funeral, paying for it out of the account and paying disbursements. When she next had the opportunity, she passed affairs to a solicitor to deal with probate. When she gave the bank account books to the solicitor—we are not talking about big money; it was about £15,000—and said, “Please sort this out and get probate,” she did not immediately think about the residual account in her name. She went back to the solicitor later to say, “I beg your pardon; I should have added this, because although it is in my name, I have never touched it other than in connection with my mother’s affairs, and I am clear that it should be dealt with as part of probate.” If the daughter had died before that was resolved and had left a will, would it have included the money in that account? That is exactly the sort of question that we must ask. There is probably more money in that account than is coming to her in another way.
I come to my last example. Often, people want to give particular things to particular organisations—charities, for example. People sometimes give extraordinary amounts to extraordinary charities, but that is their choice and they are entitled to do so.

Henry Bellingham: And to the Liberal Democrats.

Simon Hughes: Indeed, but I do not think that the Liberal Democrats are a charity, technically, although that may be the view of Committee members. However, the party has good, radical roots as an organisation, like the Labour party, and it is different from the Conservative party. But it is not a charity. Our political parties have special status.
People give to charities, but if an organisation ceases to exist—the cats’ home might be closed, or whatever—what happens? Was it intended that the sum should go to something similar or something else, or to another charity that was mentioned? I have just given three examples, but they are real-life practical ones. If people decide to do it themselves—we all agree that, ideally, one should write a will—they need someone to give them competent advice. There is a strong case for such people to come under the regulatory umbrella. I hope that the Minister is sympathetic.
Of all the amendments on the amendment paper, this is probably the least complicated, so the one defence of all good Ministers, which is that they will have to take advice on the drafting, is not available—at least, I should be surprised if it were. The Minister might say that she must talk to all the people in government who are concerned with the end of time or the end of things—there might be a lot of those at the moment—but I hope that she will be sympathetic. This is an important issue and, on balance, I think that we ought to follow the Joint Committee’s advice. I hope that we can do so, subject to a later debate about not necessarily creating a separate profession, because that is not a necessary outcome.

Henry Bellingham: There is a famous saying that people can live without lawyers, but cannot die without one. That is pertinent to what the Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey has said. We have all encountered constituency cases where total nightmares have been created by wills being fought over by relations, often on the basis of easily avoidable mistakes, which could have been circumvented if the right legal advice had been taken.
I have two current constituency cases, where a number of family members are now in serious legal dispute about the estate. In one, various members of two branches of the family are all taking different legal advice. The estate will be completely dissipated by legal fees and nothing will be left for the family members, who have been fighting over the will, to divide among themselves. As the hon. Gentleman said, the larger estates can probably withstand legal fees and the legal advice that is needed to try to sort out the mess when serious errors have occurred. However, in respect of smaller estates—often, involving families who do not have a huge amount of money—everything can be wiped out as a result of such complications.
The report of the Joint Committee on the Draft Legal Services Bill is quite compelling. We have heard exactly what it said. May I ask the Minister why the Government did not take the advice of that Committee, on which my hon. Friend the Memberfor Enfield, Southgate served? Furthermore, am I not right in saying that, among the Joint Committee’s recommendations, is the one at paragraph 216:
“there is currently no existing regulatory framework for will-writing and no existing professional body with responsibility for will-writing activities.”
Perhaps the Minister can tell me whether I am right in saying that two bodies now represent the interests of the independent will writers and that those will-writing organisations cater for and self-regulate those will writers who have set up outwith the legal profession. Those organisations are, in many ways, doing agood job.
Like my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon, I am not a natural regulator, so I tabled this probing amendment to hear what the Minister has to say. I should be grateful for an answer; I hope that her officials will know the answer. I have it on good authority that the two organisations that I mention were set up.
Paragraph 5 of schedule 2, in volume II of the Bill, describes “Reserved instrument activities”, whichrefer to
“preparing any other instrument relating to real or personal estate for the purposes of the law...or instrument relating to court proceedings”.
I am slightly confused, because a disposition of landor property by me during my lifetime is a reserved instrument activity and therefore has to be done by a qualified person, but a disposition of land by me in my will can be done without having my hand held. I should like the Minister to comment on that.
With my request for clarification on those two points, I should like the Minister to consider our probing amendment, because we feel strongly aboutit. As the hon. Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey pointed out, it is a simple amendment. The Minister is rejecting the Joint Committee’s recommendations. We need to know why she is doing that and what her current view is on how this small but flourishing industry is managing its affairs.
I am speaking slightly against our probing amendment now, but if it were accepted—the Minister will tell us her views on that in a moment—and will writing became a reserved activity, the problem would be that the two organisations that have been set up, as well as the numerous will writers out there, could presumably carry on as alternative business structures, but would have to wait until the ABS regime had been introduced. As far as I am aware, we have not received representations from will writers, but I know that they are doing a good job.
Finally, I would reject strongly any suggestion that Opposition members of the Committee do not have either a right or locus to speak on the issue. We have had a discussion about interests, and we have all declared our interests. We have been completely honourable and above board about that, so the idea that my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate could benefit if the amendment were accepted is ridiculous and fatuous. I hope that the Minister will explain the situation and look on our probing amendment in a positive light.

David Burrowes: I do not want to repeat unduly what has been said in support of the amendment, but I should like to respond to the hon. Member for Bassetlaw. I take note of your concerns about not straying into uncharted territory, Mr. Cook, but it is important always to listen carefully to the hon. Gentleman’s interpretation of the Committee on Standards and Privileges, so I await with interest to see how much he participates on clause 15 when we reach it and whether he wishes to be consistent with his remarks elsewhere.
I particularly take issue with the hon. Gentleman’s main basis for concern about the amendment and the Members’ explanatory statement, which says that the
“reserved legal activities...can only be carried out by authorised persons”.
Plainly, those authorised persons do not necessarily mean solicitors, those authorised by the Law Society or, indeed, particular firms. “Authorised persons” does not refer exclusively to a particular body; indeed, the whole rationale behind the Bill is to extend legal service activities to a range of groups. The Willwriters’ Association or any other group may well want to get involved, but the amendment is not exclusive, as the whole point of the Bill is to avoid a closed shop.
The amendment is not about saying that we should increase services and activities for solicitors firms and thereby ensure that they have a closed shop on will writing—far from it. One has genuine admiration for the hon. Gentleman’s fight on miners’ compensation and for the passion with which he follows through his constituents’ concerns, but as I understand it, he is not necessarily on a personal campaign against individual lawyers; rather, his concern is about the need for robust regulation, as he said on Second Reading. He may make that argument, but on the other hand he doesnot support an amendment that would introduce regulation in a currently unregulated field, as this amendment would.
I wonder whether other hon. Members have mentioned constituents who come to their surgeries to complain about the great grievance and injustice that is caused when their relative’s clear intention to provide a proper inheritance for a family member is frustrated. One cannot equate that injustice with others, and nor does one want to create a hierarchy of industrial injuries, pecuniary loss and injustice from a probate dispute.
The question is whether we should allow a field of increasing complexity to be so unregulated. Family relationships are increasingly complicated, and inheritance tax is an issue as well. With property prices rising, the Chancellor is taking more and more from the estates of many of my constituents, and they need proper advice on how to deal with that. There is no doubt that the regulation proposed by the amendment would be in the interests of consumers. Hon. Members should rest assured that the amendment applies a light touch.

Henry Bellingham: A light touch?

David Burrowes: Absolutely. However, there should also be consistency. If there are protestations to the effect that there should be robust regulation, and if there are cases showing the area to be one that should be regulated, rather than one in which a voluntary code can be relied on, there should be a consensus of support for change.
Finally, will the Minister say whether, since the response to the White Paper and since the Government’s own comments on such activities, which included concerns about quality control and standards, the Government have been satisfied that voluntary regulation and codes of conduct are satisfactory? What steps have been put in place to improve consumer education, and, in the substantial intervening period, has there been improvement such that regulation is not warranted?

Bridget Prentice: The debate has been interesting and I have a great deal of sympathy with some of the examples that hon. Members have given. We have all had constituents at our advice surgeries who have had problems with probate and other such issues. However, it was interesting that among all the anecdotal examples cited, there was no evidence that bad advice had been given by people who were not solicitors, for example, or that bad advice was necessarily being given by non-professionals. That is why ultimately, I shall resist the amendment.
At the beginning of his remarks, the hon. Member for Huntingdon asked me what, if any, research the Government have done on the matter. We have indeed done research and we have been reviewing the matter for some time, because, in essence, will writing sounds like something that could or should be considered a reserved legal activity. In March 2005, the Lord Chancellor said that we would consider the issue of will writing and of estate administration services. Since then, we have worked with consumer bodies and we have asked the Office of Fair Trading to review the matter. The OFT, consumer bodies and the current providers of will-writing services were asked to provide us with robust evidence that might be suggestive of systematic failure in the current system that could put consumers at risk.
A comparison was made by my hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw with claims management, which I think was a fair comparison. We have had shedloads of evidence of claims management services being badly run and badly handled, and giving bad advice that was hugely detrimental to consumers. Lots of opinions were expressed about will writing, but no evidence has been supplied to support the idea that regulation is the way forward at present.

Bob Neill: The Minister said that there was shedloads of evidence in respect of claims handling. We all accept that, but surely she would agree that the injustice potentially done to people is measured not by the quantity of such incidences, but by the damage done to those individuals. As the hon. Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey said, such problems are experienced by ordinary people with small estates; they do not receive the attention of Members of Parliament, and they are not the subject of the able campaigns that arose in respect of claims handling. Just because there is not shedloads of numerical evidence, that does not mean that there is not a real risk below the radar screen. It would therefore be sensible to regulate all those who write wills, whether or not they are members of the profession.

Bridget Prentice: I accept that numbers are not necessarily the only form of evidence. However, Iplace confidence in the work of many consumer organisations, which often begin with anecdotal evidence and then build up further evidence on whether there is a failure in the system. In a sense, that was how claims management began to show itself to be a problem.
We have not had that problem with will writing. The National Consumer Council was explicit regarding why will writing should not be a reserved service. It said that it should not be so, unless
“there is robust evidence of consumer detriment”.
It is concerned that
“Excessive regulation increases costs for consumers and constrains competition”,
and that it would
“fly in the face of the Hampton good regulation principles.”
The Conservative party makes me smile. It is asking for more regulation, but I thought that it wanted less. However, perhaps that is the new conservatism, further examples of which we look forward to seeing.
None of the evidence that has been forthcoming—limited as it is—suggests that non-regulated will writers are making more mistakes than those who are regulated. Solicitors, regulated by the Law Society, do not have formal training in will writing and are just as capable of making mistakes as those in the non-regulated sector.

Kevan Jones: I have dealt with numerous miners’ compensation cases. The Minister’s point is true of many of the legacy cases in which families were involved. The problem is not only with the writing of the will, but with dealing with the probate afterwards and the mistakes made by the solicitors.

Bridget Prentice: My hon. Friend is right. Additional evidence from Which? says that no one type of will-writing professional gave a consistently good service in its test or was significantly better than others. Which? has a pretty robust system of analysingsuch matters. I do not accept that those subject to regulation, such as solicitors, will automatically provide a better quality of service than those whoare not.

Simon Hughes: I share that view, but whatever we think about the present complaints system—clearly, we do not think it good enough, which is why we are here—at least such a system exists. If a solicitor gives a person’s family bad advice about a will or probate, there are steps that can be taken. I assume that someone could tell us how many complaints related to wills and probate have been received. However, there would be nowhere to go if we could not go to a solicitor. There is no other organisation that we could check in the same way.

Bridget Prentice: I shall come to that point in a moment because it relates to the issue raised by the hon. Members for Enfield, Southgate and for North-West Norfolk about the organisations that represent will writers. The important thing is that any regulation must be proportionate. I chide the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate for using that horrible phrase, which I am trying to ban hon. Members from using in relation to this Bill. However, regulation must be proportionate and based on an assessment of risk. The Government do not at the moment see any serious evidence of systemic failure.
The hon. Member for North-West Norfolk asked about reserved instruments and why wills are not included. One reason is that a will is a set of instructions rather than a disposition. Even if real property is left in a will, some other formal transfer would almost certainly have to take place. The Government’s approach in the Bill is exactly the same as that set out by the Solicitors Act 1974.

Simon Hughes: I think that I understand the point that the Minister is trying to make. Of course, if one writes a will saying “I give my field to Auntie Mabel”, when one dies, there has to be a probate that acts as the transfer. We have got cover for probate, which is dealt with elsewhere. The issue arises when a will is not clear. The fact that the one matter is covered does not mean that the other should not be covered, because if the will is wrong, the probate will by definition also be wrong.

Bridget Prentice: The hon. Gentleman makes a fair point.
The hon. Member for North-West Norfolk mentioned will writers’ organisations. The amendment would mean that, as a reserved activity, will writing could be done only with the proper authorisation and approval of regulators such as the Law Society. If it wanted to authorise and regulate the supply of such services, the organisations that represent will writers—the Society of Will Writers and Estate Planning Practitioners and the Institute of Professional Willwriters—would need the approval of a regulator. That is technically possible, but it would mean that the representative bodies would be brought under, for example, the Law Society’s regulatory activities.
The hon. Member for Huntingdon asked what discussions I have had with the professions. Last year, there was an event involving the Law Society, the Institute of Professional Willwriters, the Society of Will Writers and Estate Planning Practitioners and some of the consumer organisations. It was accepted that, although there is currently no statutory regulation of will writing, the Legal Services Board will be able to recommend that the Secretary of State bring it under such regulation.
That event was followed in May last year by another that was hosted by the Office of Fair Trading and the DCA, which was attended by the same organisations. The possibility of enabling people to apply to the OFT under its voluntary code scheme was suggested. For the sake of the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate, I shall outline what the scheme does. Obviously, it is not as strict as statutory regulation, which reflects the fact that different types of work need different types of regulation. The scheme aims to safeguard consumer interests by helping them to identify businesses that have a higher standard of customer care. By signing up to the approved code, a trader has agreed to provide the consumer with the benefits outlined in the code, which include clear pre-sale information—I know that, like me, the hon. Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey has advocated that at length—fair contracts and access to independent redress mechanisms. Those are the key issues that were identified in improving will-writing services. The code offers higher levels of consumer service than are required at present. The organisations are considering whether to take it on board, although I understand that many are waiting for the Bill to achieve Royal Assent before they go any further.
It is for those reasons that, much as I appreciate the examples that have been given, I cannot ask the Committee to accept the amendments. This would be an ideal issue for the consumer panel to consider and, if it felt that there was some systematic failure, to make recommendations to the Legal Services Board. I cannot in all honesty recommend that we accept it today, because we have no concrete evidence of sucha failure, so I ask the Committee to reject the amendments.

Jonathan Djanogly: This has been an interesting debate. I have an open mind on the subject. The hon. Member for Bassetlaw said that he was not sure where I was coming from, but we needed to have the debate and so tabling a probing amendment was worth while. The debate has proven that to be the case. I have some sympathy with the Minister’s point of view, and she eloquently explained how evidence is needed, ultimately, in order to regulate. I think that it is, and I was supported in that by the comment made by my hon. Friend the Member for North-West Norfolk that one should not regulate unless it is required and that there should be evidence for it.
I am not saying that the hon. Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey and my hon. Friends did not make many valid points—many were made, but many were anecdotal. I have not received any complaints about will writers, and I have received many objections to and complaints about various parts of the Bill. I am not saying that such complaints do not exist, but I have received none and I have not heard anyone else mention a particular complaint.
I note that clause 12(6) allows further legal activities to be added in due course—I think that the Minister said this—so if complaints were to arise and the matter were to become a problem, the Bill has provision to allow us to cater for that in due course. On that basis, I will ask—

Simon Hughes: I am conscious that the hon. Gentleman’s name comes first on the list, and that he might be about to withdraw the amendment. I am willing to go along with the approach that I expect him to take, although there is still a strong case and I want to ensure that we can return to the subject. There are ways in which we can check some of the things that the Minister said. If the hon. Gentleman intends to withdraw the amendment, I will not resist that today, but I hope that he will not exclude the possibility that we could table the amendment again, either in this form or a revised one, on Report. There is clearly interest and support across the Committee, and I would not want us to fail to recognise that.

Jonathan Djanogly: If evidence comes up and there is interest in re-debating the matter on Report, I would have no objection to that. We can consider that when we consider today’s debate and any further evidence that emerges before Report. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Simon Hughes: I would like to raise a question that comes up only in this clause. Is it logical in 2007 and beyond in England and Wales to separate into profession or activity some of the issues that are in the list in clause 12(1)? There are currently six issues inthe list:
“(a) the exercise of a right of audience;
(b) the conduct of litigation;
(c) reserved instrument activities;
(d) probate activities;
(e) notarial activities;
(f) the administration of oaths”.
I want to ask two questions. First, is it clear in clause 12 and onwards—and the minister can take advice on this—that we are not seeking to alter the fact that under the current system lay people can act for themselves? Obviously, one should be allowed to do as much as possible. There are rules about which court a person can appear in as a litigant and so on. I want it to be made clear in the Bill that we are not in any way saying that people should not be able to do their own thing where they can. Courts police that and judges ensure that people do not abuse the process. Although litigants in person are often difficult, I hope that we all understand that that system should continue. Will the Minister make it absolutely clear that individuals will still be allowed to represent themselves in all those areas?
The more technical point is this. I understand why, historically, there were people who carried out the administration of oaths and why there were notaries public. I exclude the Minister’s advisers who, I assume, are wise on these things, but I bet that, if I asked the Committee, colleagues in the House and people on the street what a notary does, or is entitled to do and what the difference is between a notary and a solicitor, the chance of getting the right answer would be about 1 per cent. Likewise, if “administrator of oaths” is on a plate outside a door, would that person be a solicitor? Often, the plate will say “solicitors”. It may say “solicitors”, “notaries public” or “solicitors, notaries public and administrators of oaths”. I may be about to offend some great and august organisations that represent the notaries and administrators of oaths, but, if we are trying to act in the interest of the consumer, it seems to me that we ought to put them all in one place professionally. If someone wants an oath or an affidavit sworn—I am not talking here about being a witness to somebody—logically, they should not have to think, “Do I need to go to this place? Is this authorised or regulated?”. There should be one group of people who offer a broad range of legal services similar to that of a traditional solicitor. It is time to have administrators of oaths, notaries public and solicitors all doing one job so that all the people who offer those services, although they are separate jobs, will be in the same professional organisations.
I would be grateful if the Minister would put onthe record, probably as much for my education and elucidation as other people’s, what notarial activities are. I know that we will hear definitions of such terms later on, but I do not think that we have a separate definition of notarial activities. I will probably be shown later that we do. We all understand what administrators of oaths do: they are people before whom we can swear an oath. But do they do anything else? We all understand what it means to exercise the right of audience. I presume that we all understand the conduct of litigation and probate activities. This is a plea, first, for the Minister to reflect, possibly out loud, on advice, on whether it is time to roll those things together in the consumer interest and secondly for her to think about whether we need to provide different arrangements, definitions and so on. In the interests of simplicity, we are regulating the legal profession and sorting out legal services. Let us seize the moment and get rid of a bit of history that, although it may have been relevant in the past, is no longer justified or logical, as far as I know, in the present.

Bridget Prentice: As the hon. Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey says, six activities are reserved under the Bill. They are all currently regulated and will be overseen by the Legal Services Board, once established. Anyone who carries on or pretends to be entitled to carry on any of the relevant activities will be guilty of an offence under clauses 14, 16, and 17.
I direct the hon. Gentleman to schedule 2, as he suggested I might, which defines the scope of the reserved activities. Paragraph 7 of schedule 2 contains a definition of activities relating to legal systemsin other jurisdictions, which are therefore different activities from many others carried out by solicitors. However, I have some sympathy with what the hon. Gentleman said about there being a one-stop shop, and all the rest of it, if that were possible. I am reminded of the classic question for law students about whether there should be a unified profession. I thought that he was going down that road, but this Committee is not the place to develop that debate.
The Lord Chancellor can extend the list of reserved activities under clause 24 and, under clause 26, the board can ask the Lord Chancellor to remove an activity from the list. For example, if probate appeared never to cause anybody any problems whatsoever, it would be possible for the board to recommend to the Lord Chancellor that it be outwith the designated list. I call the Committee’s attention to subsection (3), which is important and sets the scope for the activities that would be regulated by the board in future.
I hope that I have dealt with the hon. Gentleman’s questions. On that basis, I move that the clause stand part of the Bill.

Simon Hughes: I was aware of the relevant parts of schedule 2. Perhaps I can take the Minister back to the provisions she rightly directed us to. Paragraph 6 is clear, because it says:
“‘Probate activities’ means preparing any probate papers for the purposes of the law of England and Wales or in relation to any proceedings in England and Wales...on which to found or oppose...a grant of probate, or...a grant of letters”.
The Minister knows what I am going to say next—
 Bridget Prentice indicated assent.

Simon Hughes: It does not say what the job is. It states:
“‘Notarial activities’ means”—
wait for it—
“activities which, immediately before the appointed day, were customarily carried on by virtue of enrolment as a notary in accordance with section 1 of the Public Notaries Act 1801”.
It says that notarial activities are what notaries do. I am tempted to use a phrase that has come to mind; it is rather mischievous to mention it, but I will do so anyway. My dear friend the Bishop of Southwark was in some difficulty last year and, when asked what he did, he replied from inside his car, “I am the Bishop of Southwark and this is what I do.” It is a rather circumlocutory definition.
Paragraph 7(2) says:
“Sub-paragraph (1) does not include...reserved instrument activities and probate activities...or...administration of oaths.”
We know that those are covered elsewhere,
First, we are entering the territory of, “Let’s say what we are doing here, good people.” Secondly, although the Minister might not yet be ready to deal with the bigger question, if the job is a specific, technical one, then surely it is something that a solicitor could be trained to do. The reality is that we live in a globalised world—we have had that argument—in which papers from around the world come across jurisdictional frontiers, including from Scotland and Northern Ireland to England and Wales or to Ireland. Bluntly, to have a separate group of people who are qualified to do that particular bit of work seems to me wrong.
Similarly, the Bill does not define administration of oaths by reference to the swearing of documents for a certain purpose. It says:
“The ‘administration of oaths’ means the exercise of the powers conferred on a commissioner of oaths by—”
and then refers back to three older pieces of legislation that are each just over a hundred years old.
If we want to retain separate definitions, then please by Report, could we have definitions by reference to what is done, rather than by reference to the creating legislation? Could we also reflect on whether, when the Bill is enacted, we need separate commissioners for oaths, notaries public and solicitors? We should clarify one bit of the wood, so that we can see it for the trees.

Bridget Prentice: I am going to make a kind of intervention on the hon. Gentleman, but he will not like it very much, because there is in fact no statutory definition of notarial activities. The requirement is not one that derives from English law, but from foreign jurisdictions—not from England and Wales or Scotland, but mostly from Latin countries such as Spain or Italy. They are the jurisdictions in which notarial activities are needed.
To make things even more exciting, I shall give the hon. Gentleman an example of those activities. They include matters such as the certification of a ship’s manifest. It is therefore not surprising that my friend Mrs. McGlumshie does not call on a notary very often.

Simon Hughes: That might be the most revealing part of the afternoon. The fact that notarial activities are ultimately not defined is wonderful. Only by looking back, as a student, at the three Acts of Parliament that are referred to, or at the Act dating from 1801 that is referred to in schedule 2 paragraph 7(1), does one discover the answer to one’s question.
On the so-called continent—I should really say the rest of the continent or the mainland——where the non-common law traditions apply, people are called notaries or advocates, rather than solicitors. I can understand that one needs people to carry out the equivalent function. I shall reflect, and I ask the Minister to do the same, because there might be a chance to sort out some unreconstructed historical legal complication.

Jonathan Djanogly: The role of notaries is an ancient one and I think that there is an old statute somewhere that regulates that role.

Simon Hughes: From 1801.

Jonathan Djanogly: Indeed. In practical, everyday terms, however, I think that the hon. Gentleman is slightly doing down the role of notaries. By the way, they are heavily used in Germany too, not only in Latin countries. Although their purpose on the continent is to document agreements, if people in this country want to enter into contracts with a party on the continent, they often have to go to notaries. The result is that they are used frequently in this country by people doing business in Europe. There are not that many notaries, but those that exist tend to fulfil a useful role.

Simon Hughes: I have absolutely no doubt that they fulfil a useful role and I am sure that I shall personally discover all the notaries in England and Wales as they will now make themselves known to me and justify their fantastic work. I absolutely understand that people who practise law in one country and dealwith another need a cross-referencing professional qualification. My understanding is that the entire range of non-common law jurisdictions has the notarial facility—Italy and Spain, France and Germany, the low countries and so on, as well as Scandinavia and all the rest; in fact, all European Union countries except probably the common law countries: the UK, Cyprus and Malta.
I have opened a Pandora’s box, and I shall probably regret it, but we shall see. If we are modernising and reforming legal services, this might represent a teeny bit of progress. If we do not change the law on it today, the law might be changed sooner as a result of today’s little poke at the system.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 12 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 2

The reserved legal activities

Question proposed, The this schedule be the Second schedule to the Bill.

Henry Bellingham: I have one point to make on schedule 2. Paragraph 5(1) mentions “Reserved instrument activities”, about which I made a point when we discussed clause 12 and will writing. Will the Minister elaborate on paragraph 5(1)(c), which states that “reserved instrument activities” means, among other things,
“any other instrument relating to real or personal estate for the purposes of the law of England”?
To what does “other instrument” refer? We were discussing making over property, transfers, contracts and dispositions of property, but will the Minister tell us more about paragraph 5(1)(c)?

Bridget Prentice: I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman was out of the room when I responded to his questions on the matter—it is possible that he missed what said. I explained that a will is a set of instructions as opposed to a disposition. In that sense, it contrasts with gifts or conveyances when dealing with the transfer of property. Real property left in a will would require further formal transfer. We are dealing with similar matters in paragraph 5(1)(c), but I shall write to him with some specific examples so that we can move the debate on.

Henry Bellingham: I am grateful to the Minister and mortified at my insubordination. I left the room to track down the Conservative Whip.

Schedule 2 agreed to.

Clause 13

Entitlement to carry on a reserved legal activity

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Simon Hughes: I have one question apart from the observation that, if we lived in a world in which we had the responsibility of tracking down the party Whips, we might be much happier.
Will the Minister address my earlier question andsay whether she is satisfied that the Bill makes it clear when and where people can represent themselves, and therefore the circumstances in which they would not need to operate under a regulatory regime?

Henry Bellingham: I have a question on clause 13(4), which states:
“Nothing in this section or section 23 affects section 84 ofthe Immigration and Asylum Act 1999...which prohibits the provision of immigration advice and immigration services except by certain persons.”
Section 23 will concern
“transitional protection for non-commercial bodies”.
Why does that mention the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 and not, for example, the relevant housing, employment or agricultural holdings legislation, which also give certain persons the power and authority to provide advice in certain circumstances? I am bemused why the measure applies to only one piece of legislation.

Bridget Prentice: First, I apologise to the hon. Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey. He is right that an individual acting on his own behalf would not have to be regulated when conducting legal activities.
The reasoning behind clause 13(4) is that, as thehon. Member for North-West Norfolk might remember, there were some horrific examples of dubious characters giving appallingly bad advice to people regarding immigration and asylum. The Government considered those examples and are now trying to ensure that people who give advice are properly qualified to do so. That is why such matters have been specified.

Simon Hughes: I am grateful to the Minister. Does the Bill actually say that, if people want to represent themselves in such activities, they do not have tohave authority? I want to ensure that the Bill is clear. Clause 13 states:
“The question whether a person is entitled to carry on an activity which is a reserved legal activity is to be determined solely in accordance with the provisions of this Act.”
There should be a sentence after that saying that nothing in the Bill will prevent an individual from acting for himself in any of the reserved activities, when the law permits.

Bridget Prentice: Paragraph 1(6) of schedule 3 covers such matters. It sets out a list of people who are exempt and will deal with the hon. Gentleman’s worry about whether the individual can conduct activity on his own behalf. Paragraph 1(10) might give more details.

Simon Hughes: I am happy to look more carefully at the schedule and to come back to the Minister, if necessary, but whether going to schedule 3 to discover the answer to my question rather than finding it up front under clause 13 is right, I do not know.

Bridget Prentice: The provision “E is an individual” under paragraph 3(3)(a) of schedule 3 might provide the information that the hon. Gentleman needs.

Simon Hughes: I am grateful to the Minister. It seems fine. However, it might have been better to have said up front rather than under the schedule that individuals who do their own thing are exempt from the regulations. It would make matters clear for those who wonder whether they have to go through regulatory control. However, I leave it to the hon. Lady to reflect on the matter.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 13 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 14

Offence to carry on a reserved legal activity if not entitled

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

John Mann: I have two observations to make about the clause. The impersonating of a solicitor can lead to an individual being locked up and further increase the pressures on the prison community. Clearly, that is in order but, as for solicitors being disciplined, last year there were 743 matters against 1,094 individuals that had a disciplinary issue recorded against a solicitor and a further 495 matters involved 529 individuals that referred to other bodies, including the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal and the Association of Chief Police Officers.
Often, such matters do not need to be put in the public domain. For example, disapprovals, warnings, reprimands and severe reprimands can be kept private and confidential. The public—even the initial complainant who has provided information— need not be, and often is not, informed of that. Does the Minister consider that the issue needs to be looked at further even though the law is more than protecting the solicitor or other legal professional as it rightly does under the clause with appropriate strict measures? I commend her on that. We must also ensure that in a large number of cases—much more than has been suggested in Committee—such matters should be made public.
My second point concerns when the Government have acted as an employer through the Department of Trade and Industry in coal mining cases. There have been several examples when people have gone to those whom they believe to be solicitors and the Government have entertained cases being brought forward as ifon a common law basis, including more than 10,000 industrial deafness cases brought by a private company called Vendside Ltd. People often think that theyhave a solicitor representing them when they do not. Should not the Government look at their own practises that may be encouraging people whom some of my constituents, and many others, believe to be impersonating solicitors? That is apparent both in the hearing loss claims and in respect of claims handlers, who people are still coming to me about, believing them to be solicitors when they are not, who have been allowed to take cases to the Government under the coal mining claims handling agreement.

Simon Hughes: Once the Bill becomes law, does the Minister envisage that she or I, or anybody, would be able to go to a website and check the name of somebody who said that they were John Mann or Simon Hughes, for example, and were competent as a probate solicitor, or whatever? Will there be one place where people can check on an up-to-date, guaranteed-to-be-correct database whether people are approved and regulated? Again, if we are trying to make life easy, we need a list, giving details of who is legitimately carrying out the activities, which can always be relied on, then people would be much less likely to carry on activities illegally and end up in the courts as a result.

Bridget Prentice: I just want to make the Committee aware that the penalties are consistent with those in the Compensation Act 2006 in respect of regulated claims management. Criminal convictions are a matter of public record and in that sense would be available to all. I cannot go as far as the hon. Gentleman has asked me to and guarantee that the relevant information would be available or that people could see on a website whether a person has the right to carry out a reserved legal activity. However, that matter runs parallel with another that he raised earlier, about people being able to know when they walk through the solicitor’s door what individuals do. People can check their solicitor’s credentials by going to the Law Society’s website. It maintains a list of all solicitors that are properly qualified. This part of the Bill extends that provision to cover everyone involved in the new framework.

Simon Hughes: If I want somebody to do some plumbing, I know that the person who comes to do the central heating boiler, or whatever, will need to conform with the CORGI registration scheme, under which plumbers are CORGI-registered. Again, I should like the Minister to reflect on whether the objective should be for people to be able to check at any time whether anybody in the legal services field is, on that date, registered to do the job on the official list. Data systems are never perfect. However, given that the purpose of the Bill is to establish an umbrella in relation to reserved legal activities, with the Legal Services Board regulating all the people involved, the consumer interest must be that people should be able to go to one place and should not have to duck and dive. We are talking about people who are not familiar with the places the professionals inhabit and do not necessarily understand the distinction. Perhaps the Minister could reflect on that, because if we could achieve that it would benefit the whole system.

Bridget Prentice: I am happy to consider a simpler way in which that could be achieved.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 14 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 15

Carrying on of a reserved legal activity: employers and employees etc

Bridget Prentice: I beg to move amendment No. 108, in clause 15, page 7, line 15, at end insert—
‘( ) Where P is an independent trade union, persons provided with relevant services by virtue of—
(a) their membership or former membership of P, or
(b) another person’s membership or former membership of P,
do not constitute the public or a section of the public.’.

Frank Cook: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments Nos. 109, 110, 138, 115 to 117, 126 to 128, 202 and 205.

Bridget Prentice: The amendments are designed to give effect to the policy that my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer set out on Second Reading in the other place. He said:
“We do not intend the Bill to regulate in any way lay trade union representation, whether whole or part-time in the workplace, nor to place additional burdens on those unions that provide legal advice or representation to their members.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 6 December 2006; Vol. 687,c. 1167.]
We are doing that because unions are in a different position from most legal services providers. They carry out a great deal of work through officials in the workplace, who are usually elected by colleagues rather than professional union staff and are working at some distance from the union’s head office, and they do it in a specific context.
I need to say this not so much for my colleagueson the Government side of the Committee but for Members of the Opposition who may not be as aware of trade unions and their remit as the rest of us are. Although a union official may give advice, the purpose is not just to help the member. It is part of the wider role of fostering good labour relations. The officialin that situation can advise only members, retired members and family members and no one else. The union does not offer that service to the general public. I want to say that up front because that might be an area in which some of the argument will be fought out. The union is giving advice only to its own members.
One other feature that the Opposition need to remember is that unions are already regulated by the certification process. The work of officials is governed by the union’s rule book, and that is enforced through the certification officer. Therefore, unions that provide legal services do not need the same degree of regulation as bodies that are offering services more widely or commercially.

Jonathan Djanogly: For those of us who clearly have so little knowledge of unions, will the Minister explain what a member is in the context of union membership?

Bridget Prentice: A member of a union is someone who pays the union levy, abides by the union rulebook, and works collectively with other members of that union and, sometimes, inter-collectively with colleagues in other unions. It also applies to relations of a particular member and people who have been members of a union but are now retired.

David Burrowes: The Minister is using the principle of not regulating a legal service that applies in a limited way. Is that a definition that she would like to apply to other legal services as well?

Bridget Prentice: I do not think that that applies in other legal services. I am looking specifically at the role of trade unions here and why we are exempting them in this part of the Bill.

David Burrowes: Just to make it clear, the Minister’s description of this type of legal service was on the basis that it was limited and non-commercial. Surely if there was a competing legal service or a new service, the regulation would be applied in a very limited way to its members on a non-commercial basis. Would they also be exempt from regulation in the same way as unions?

Bridget Prentice: It would certainly be the case that if other organisations were providing legal services that were not reserved activities, they would be exempt. If the hon. Gentleman goes back to schedule 3, he will see all the opportunities for exemption there.
Also, regulating a union in such a dispersed set-up would be both impractical and inappropriate. The amendment would remove the requirement for the independent trade unions to be regulated as entities.

Henry Bellingham: The Minister mentioned the speech made by the noble Lord Falconer of Thoroton on Second Reading in the other place. I am trying to find the part in the debate where he apparently made those comments about trade unions and about his desire, at that stage, for those Government amendments, but I cannot find it—perhaps he spoke on Third Reading. Can the Minister say why those amendments were not moved in another place? Did they require so much work and effort that the Government had to wait until the Bill appeared here?

Bridget Prentice: I do not know which part of the Lords debate the hon. Gentleman is referring to. It was during the debate on Second Reading that the Lord Chancellor signalled that we would exempt trade unions. We have had continued discussions with the TUC and the Law Society, which has raised concerns about the issue. That is why the amendments have come forward at this stage—in part, because the TUC was concerned that the way in which the Bill was originally set up did not achieve what the Lord Chancellor said that it would achieve. In fact, if the hon. Gentleman refers to column 1167 of the Official Report of the Second Reading debate in the other place, he will find what the Lord Chancellor said. We have had important discussions with the TUC and the Law Society about the position of trade unions. That is why it has taken some time to come to the present position.
The provision will allow employed lawyers to work, for example, for bodies linked to their employers, such as subsidiary companies, for colleagues, or on a pro bono basis, without their employers needing to be treated as providers of legal services. The Bill will enable the work of those employed lawyers to continue as now. However, there are tight restrictions on that exception, which applies only if the provision of legal services to the public is not part of the employer’s business.
To return to the point about other bodies thatmight be non-commercial, the problem would be in identifying that the work that such bodies were doing was absolutely confined to members only. However, if such bodies were working for a section of the public, they would not secure an exemption under the Bill.

Bob Neill: The Minister makes the point about such bodies being limited to advice given to members, but can she help us on how “members” will be defined in that context? I ask that because, in a debate referring to miners’ compensation claims, the hon. Member for North Durham properly highlighted the extraordinary situation of the National Union of Mineworkersin Durham, which had a large number of associate members. It seemed that they were members of the union, but they paid only an access fee, simply for some legal services, and had no voting rights within the union, as far as was ascertainable. How will she ensure that what appears to have been, in effect, a bogus membership arrangement is dealt with? Could unions provide legal services to associate members, such as those in the Durham NUM, without being caught by the provision?

Bridget Prentice: The hon. Gentleman makes a fair point on the issue that my hon. Friend the Member for North Durham has rightly raised in the past. As I have described, members are people who pay the full union levy, their families and retired members. Associate members are not covered by the clause.

Bob Neill: I am sorry to press the Minister, but will she point out the specific wording that gives that important definition? If that will be the case, it is important that it be spelled out unequivocally.

Bridget Prentice: I hope that, during my remarks, I shall be able to spell it out unequivocally for the hon. Gentleman.

Kevan Jones: This is an important point, and I raise it although I support the amendments. The definition of membership is an issue to consider. I accept that the certification officer regulates trade unions, but I say to my hon. Friend the Minister that I got a letter today from the certification officer telling me that the fully paid-up membership of Durham NUM is seven members, even though in its return to the certification officer, it claimed to have 15,000 members.

Bridget Prentice: My hon. Friend makes a good case for the robust way in which the certification officer deals with the matter. That is a good example of why we do not need further regulation of trade unions on the issue.

Kevan Jones: I do not want to labour the point, as I accept the amendments, but it needs pinning down. Unfortunately, the certification officer’s letter to me did not answer my question about what rights the individuals concerned have. I do not think that they are covered by the definition of a member of a trade union, which, as I understand it, means someone who voluntarily joins a union to get its benefits. They joined on associate membership with no rights whatever, so the matter needs clearing up.

Bridget Prentice: I have no doubt that my hon. Friend will pursue this further with the certification officer, because my understanding—I hope that this will answer the question asked by the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst—is that members are defined in the rulebook of the independent trade unions concerned.

John Mann: I refer Members to the Register of Members’ Interests and the occasional use of an office provided for me, not least for this kind of work, by the GMB union for meetings of large numbers of my constituents and others.
Will the Minister give a written note of guidance on the role that the certification officer will need to play in the context of the clause, so that there is no ambiguity for the union member, the certification officer or the general public about how the officer will be expected to ensure consumer rights in respect of reserved legal activities? I accept the Minister’s point that a dualityof systems would constitute over-regulation, so the certification officer needs to be very clear about his remit.

Bridget Prentice: That is a very good suggestion. I am happy to provide that guidance, and I hope that I will do so during the Committee stage, but if not—

Sitting suspended for a Division in the House.

On resuming—

Bridget Prentice: I want now to move on to the concerns that certain hon. Members raised on Second Reading and to reassure the Committee that the Government have no intention of leaving union members unprotected or less well protected than others. The important point is that reserved activities will still need to be carried out by authorised persons—in other words, by qualified lawyers. They will still be subject to full regulation by the Law Society or by whichever other approved regulator is appropriate, and they will still be subject to all the rules of the relevant regulator.

John Hemming: As a union member, I am not totally unaware of what unions do. However, it might be interesting for us to hear some examples of the reserved legal activities that unions undertake.

Bridget Prentice: That is a very good point. As far as individual members are concerned, unions do not deal very often with reserved activities. Reserved activities tend most often to be dealt with by the union head office, and most unions use outside law firms, which are clearly regulated already, to deal with them.

John Hemming: What sort of reserved activities is the Minister talking about when she refers to reserved activities that are dealt with through a union head office?

Bridget Prentice: A union could be involved in litigation, or it might have to appear in court. Rightsof audience are a reserved legal activity, and those involved in court appearances must therefore be properly regulated.

John Hemming: I am sorry to labour the point, but to what extent do unions currently employ barristers to go into court?

Kevan Jones: Every day.

John Hemming: Is that quite common? I am trying to get an understanding.

Bridget Prentice: My hon. Friend the Member for North Durham said, from a sedentary position, that it happens every day. I do not know whether that is the case, but I know that it happens fairly regularly. The most obvious example is that of personal injury cases, which involve trade union attendance in court on behalf of members. I am told that the unions use outside firms to conduct that litigation most of the time.
The use of qualified lawyers is already subject to all the rules of the regulators, and any rule change made by those regulators would apply equally to the union lawyers as to everyone else. It would always be open to a trade union to seek to be licensed under the low-risk provisions in part 5 of the Bill, and they mightchoose to do so if they wished to provide services commercially or to a wider section of the public. I suspect that they would not, because it would probably not be in their financial interests to do so. However, a further situation in which they might seek a licence would be if they were not content with the rulesunder which the approved regulators regulated their employed lawyers.
It might also reassure the Committee to know that the Office for Legal Complaints will be able to handle complaints about union services. Many unions provide only a very basic legal service to their members and use outside firms for other work—often one with which the union has a special arrangement.

Kevan Jones: Will the Minister give way?

Bridget Prentice: I knew that I would interest my hon. Friend as soon as I made that comment.

Kevan Jones: I should like to my hon. Friend to clarify what she just said about recourse to the Legal Complaints Service. The position that she outlined would apply only if the union employed an outside lawyer, or, as is the case for some unions, if the union employed an in-house lawyer to act for it. Is that not the case?

Bridget Prentice: Yes, but such an in-house lawyer would be regulated by the Law Society, so that the relevant member would have the same redress as anyone else. In any event, union members are not obliged to use the union lawyer and can use other providers.

Kevan Jones: I am sorry for being a bit of a pain this afternoon, but will the Minister explain something—if not now, then later in writing? I understand how the lawyers employed from an outside firm will be regulated, but what about the individuals? Some unions still employ in-house lawyers. Would they be regulated by the Law Society, or would they be exempted by the bar proposed in the amendment?

Bridget Prentice: No, any lawyer employed who was conducting reserved activities would be regulated by the regulator. I imagine that even an individual lawyer would almost always be regulated by the Law Society, although they could be regulated by one of the other regulators.

Jonathan Djanogly: Is the Minister saying that, in such circumstances, the lawyer would in effect be disbarred or whatever, and that the union would get off scot-free?

Bridget Prentice: I am not sure whether I fully understood the hon. Gentleman’s question. Will he expand on it?

Jonathan Djanogly: If a union used an in-house lawyer to give legal advice, would it be untouchable in such a situation, because only the lawyer would be subject to regulation?

Bridget Prentice: Only the lawyer would be subject to regulation because the union would not be an entity as defined in the Bill.

John Hemming: I am confused. As I understand it, offering advice is not a regulated legal activity. It is a legal activity, but not regulated. Although there are issues of negligence, about which I shall talk later, I have difficulty in understanding how a union could not have an in-house lawyer who could offer legal advice, whether or not they were an authorised person.

Bridget Prentice: The in-house lawyer could certainly offer legal advice, but in terms of regulated activities they would have to be regulated. That is the point that I have been trying to make.
I move on to the final part of the reason for the amendments—

John Mann: I am not absolutely clear. Let me give two examples, on which the Minister may not like to comment, but I am sure will be prepared to. What about the case of the canteen women, when the NUM and Scargill disgracefully lost—

Frank Cook: Order. Can I be certain that this is an intervention and not a speech?

John Mann: Absolutely; I am asking a question of the Minister.

Frank Cook: Be brief, please.

John Mann: Thank you, Mr. Cook. This is purely a question for the Minister. I am asking her about the 1,400 claims that Scargill lost for canteen workers. Some 1,400 women had potential claims, but not against the solicitor. The solicitor took the cases forward, but not for those 1,400 because their claims disappeared. To whom would those women complain? A similar case would be one in which, say, an individual was advised by the union that they did not have a case, even though they did.

Bridget Prentice: In that instance, the individuals could have a claim against the union itself through the union mechanism. If a lawyer gives legal advice in the capacity that my hon. Friend mentioned, the complaint could go through the Law Society’s complaints mechanism. The Law Society could even, for example, make its rules more restrictive. That would limit the union’s ability to provide reserved services. There would be two mechanisms—the first through the certification officer and the other through the lawyer following the rules of his or her legal authority—in this case, the Law Society.

John Hemming: Will the Minister give way?

Bridget Prentice: I shall only do so one more time.

John Hemming: Would there be a third mechanism: an action for negligence through the courts?

Bridget Prentice: I made the point earlier that an individual member of a trade union may seek independent legal advice. They may decide to take the matter through the courts either on their own or after receiving further legal advice.
Finally, I wish to emphasise that the measure relates only to independent trade unions as defined in the 1992 legislation. Other trade unions are not dealt with—they will have to be authorised and licensed to provide any reserved legal services, even to their members. I wish to make it absolutely clear that organisations such as that described in early-day motion 847, which mentions the 
“launch by the British National Party (BNP) of a trade union front organisation”,
are not defined as independent trade unions. Such organisations would not therefore qualify under the measure, even if they in some sense became a proper organisation.
The amendments will ensure that unions are able to continue to provide valuable services to their members and that members have proper protection. They will not mean that union members receive a lower standard of work than other consumers; on the contrary, this is another opportunity for union members to receive the standards of service that they deserve.

Jonathan Djanogly: The Government amendments to clause 15 and other measures winged their way to the Opposition a few days ago from out of the blue. Frankly, they have come as something as a shock to us. Rather than making special provision for unions within the regulatory framework, the amendments go further to explicitly exclude unions from regulation. Is that justified? We say that it is not. The amendments are a clear example of the Labour party kow-towing to its union paymasters, flying in the face of reason, considerations of fairness to the consumer, and frightening recent experiences, not least those highlighted by the hon. Member for North Durham in a recent Adjournment debate in which I also spoke.
I hope that the hon. Member for North Durham will speak on the issue. In the debate on coal health claims on 23 May, he showed how certain trade unions abuse their unregulated position. For the Government to amend the Bill to abolish regulations on trade unions is outrageous.
Let us talk about vested interests. The Conservatives have no objection to the mechanisms by which trade unions and commercial entities may provide legal services, as long as there is proper regulation to protect the public and individual consumers. Under the original Bill, trade unions, like every other non-lawyer body wishing to provide reserved legal services, would have to do so as an alternative business structure firm. The Bill now makes special provisions for trade unions to reflect their constitutions. In particular, it excludes trade unions from the requirement for a head of financial administration or a head of legal practice. That approach arose from the Government’s view that trade unions should be able to provide reserved legal services, rather than having them establish ring-fenced subsidiaries to do so, as commercial providers of legal services are likely to do.
Despite those special provisions for trade unions in the alternative business structure regime, the TUC has apparently been unhappy about the principle of trade union legal services being subject to any regulation. It argues that it would be inappropriate for unions to be regulated by a legal services board, and claims that unions are effectively regulated by the trade union certification officer. The TUC, however, has no difficulty with the proposition that individual lawyers providing services will be regulated as individuals by the relevant approved regulator. I shall return to the matter of the trade union certification officer.
The trade unions point in particular to the possibility that, if they were required to become an ABS under the Bill, advice on potential employment disputes given by lay shop stewards could fall within the ambit of regulation. That is arguable. From their point of view, it is undesirable for such advice to fall within legal services regulation. However, there are two ways in which such advice could be exempted without needing to exempt trade unions from the provisions of the Bill altogether. First, trade unions could provide reserved legal services through a wholly owned ring-fenced entity, which would obviously not include the lay advisers. Secondly, there could be a specific provision in the Bill exempting lay ‘shop floor’ advice from the ambit of regulation.

John Hemming: I am confused, again, about regulated legal services and legal services. A few moments ago, it appeared that advice was not a regulated legal service. If that is so, informal advice from the union convenors would never be regulated, unless it were added as a regulated legal service under clause 24. Therefore, most of the debate about advice is otiose.

Jonathan Djanogly: The hon. Gentleman makes an interesting point. I shall be interested to hear the Minister’s views on that. I speculate that such advice would probably be in connection with litigation, but I look forward to the Minister confirming that that is so.
The trade unions pressed for a wider exemption. However, the Government’s intention to concede that only appeared in the Minister’s statement on Second Reading. I put on the record that the Conservative party is thoroughly unimpressed with the Government’s lack of transparency and their lack of consultation on this issue.
I have been told that, in discussions with the Ministry of Justice and the TUC, the Law Society considered the possibility of an exemption for legal work that was ancillary to the trade unions’ collective bargaining role. That would mean that the trade union would not be required to become an ABS to pursue litigation arising out of an employment dispute, an injury at work and so on. Even then, the individual lawyer would, of course, be regulated. However, on advice from the SRA, the Law Society concluded that it is unwise for there to be such an exemption. I shall return to the SRA’s view on that later.
The SRA is, with the Law Society’s support, increasingly moving towards the regulation of the entities through which legal services are provided, rather than just the regulation of individuals. It is difficult to regulate to ensure proper quality of service and client care by regulating individual lawyers alone, rather than the entity through which they provide legal services. The hon. Member for Bassetlaw gave a good example of that. Accordingly, it does not make sense for services provided by trade unions to be exempted from that approach and it certainly cannot be assumed that there are no problems with services provided by trade unions. Some unions’ roles in the miners’ compensation cases has caused particular concern.
The question is to what extent the certification officer can regulate the union. We agree with many, including the Law Society, that any regulation undertaken by the certification officer cannot possibly fill this gap. The certification officer cannot realistically deal with issues about client care or quality of service as they relate to legal services. Indeed, the certification officer does not appear to have been able to help with the issues arising in the miners’ compensation cases. The Minister, in her earlier remarks, failed to deal with that or with the related point made by the hon. Member for Bassetlaw.

John Mann: Does the hon. Gentleman accept that the certification officer could not act in relation to the miners’ compensation claims because the claimants were not members of the union, but ex-members? On that basis, he said that he could not take up the case.

Jonathan Djanogly: In the particular circumstance that the hon. Gentleman mentions, I accept that that may be so.
We do not accept that unions do not, in practice, sometimes act as claims handlers. This matter arose in the debate secured by the hon. Member for North Durham, as my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst mentioned in his earlier intervention.

Kevan Jones: But if unions act as claims handlers, as the Durham National Union of Miners certainly does, they would have to be registered under the new Compensation Act 2006—and I understand that they have gone for regulation under that act.

Jonathan Djanogly: Again, I agree that those are particular circumstances in relation to claims handling for which regulation may well be appropriate.
The Government amendment goes far beyond even what was discussed by officials. It will exempt trade unions from the requirement to become an ABS in relation to all services provided to members, former members and relatives of members, provided that those services were part of the membership package, whether or not they were part of the employment relationship.
The Government have emphasised that trade unions will have to provide reserved services through qualified persons. I think that the Minister confirmed that earlier. We assume that those qualified persons will be fully subject to the regulatory requirements of their professional bodies. If that assumption is correct, the SRA or another regulatory body may conclude that the public interest requires lawyers to provide particular reserved services to trade union members only in a regulated environment. In that case the SRA could, as it can now, make rules to that effect. Those rules would, of course, require the approval of the Legal Services Board and could therefore be made only if there were a demonstrable regulatory need for them and the proposed restriction was a proportionate response.
The Government amendments do not preclude a trade union from becoming an ABS or establishinga separate, wholly owned vehicle that would itself become an ABS to provide reserved legal services to members. Accordingly, if regulators concluded that lawyers employed by trade unions should provide particular reserved services to members only through a regulated entity, unions would readily be able to adapt. There is thus no risk that such a decision by regulators would preclude trade unions from providing particular legal services to members. Will the Minister confirm that that is the intended effect of the amendments?
Having discussed those matters with the Law Society, I then thought that I should approach the SRA, as it has an important part to play and its view is pertinent to the issue. It is important to put its response on record. It asks hon. Members to reject the amendment, which it says
“will have the effect of exempting trade unions from being regulated in the same way as other bodies who provide legal services to the extent that they provide such services to their membership.
The SRA are opposed to any route that would exempt trade unions from Part 5 in relation to reserved legal activities. The SRA’s view is that trade union members deserve the same protection in relation to reserved activities as any other consumer of legal services.”
It states that it opposes an amendment effectively stating that activities are reserved legal activities when done by an in-house solicitor but not when done by a union. The issue, it states, is
“a matter of principle—the principle that the Bill is seeking to achieve for the future, and the principle envisaged by the Clementi Report. This principle is that any organisation providing reserved legal services to the public or a section of the public needs to be properly and proportionately regulated.”

Stephen Hesford: I am listening with care to what the hon. Gentleman is saying. Is he making a point about competition—that the amendments will somehow give trade unions an unfair competitive advantage—or a consumer protection point? If it is the latter, does he have any evidence from union members that they want protection from their own unions? Or is he making both points?

Jonathan Djanogly: I had not thought about the competition aspects, but that might be an angle tobe considered. Has the Minister received any representations on that? It might be a relevant issue to discuss. On the hon. Gentleman’s second question, we can take the issue of miners’ compensation. Thousands of so-called members have a serious problem with the way they have been treated, and many of them want their membership subscriptions returned to them by their unions.
The Clementi report considered that the new principle whereby both bodies and individuals are regulated should apply to both new commercial bodies providing reserved legal services and not-for-profit organisations such as law centres and trade unions. It recognised that otherwise, there would be gaps in the regulation intended to protect consumers and the public interest. The SRA has argued that exempting certain providers of reserved services from the consumer protections of regulation should be done only in exceptional circumstances, when there is clear evidence of public interest. To do otherwise would be to place the interests of providers above those of consumers. The example of abuse by trade unions during the coal miners’ compensation scandal shows why exemptions are dangerous.
According to the SRA, the concessions already made in the Bill in relation to the regulation of trade unions and other low-risk bodies will ensure that the regulation is proportionate. It agrees that the concerns of the TUC about the position of lay advisers in the workforce are legitimate. The SRA believes that the non-reserved legal activities of lay advisers can safely be exempted from the ambit of part 5 of the Bill on the proviso that the union organises the activities of such advisers so that they are not subject to the supervision of a solicitor or an authorised person. It assumes that that is currently the case for shop stewards, other local representatives and elected national officials.
The SRA believes that that may be achieved by providing that legal advice—not a reserved legal activity—given by union representatives who are employees and not acting in the capacity of authorised persons or under the supervision of an authorised person should be defined as not being “legal activities” for the purpose of the Bill. It believes that amendments could be made to ensure that such work would be entirely outside the concerns of part 5.
The SRA says that the Government believe that the regulation of the individual lawyers by their respective approved regulators is sufficient. The SRA disagrees with that view. Its powers in relation to the individual solicitors it authorises do not provide full consumer protection. Also, in-house teams include individuals who are regulated by different approved regulators and subject to different rules and protections. The Bill’s main objective is to provide that the same consumer protections and rules benefit those receiving legal services from an organisation. It should not matter whether the service was provided by a solicitor, barrister or licensed conveyancer.
The current situation in which in-house solicitors can do restricted types of work because the organisation is not subject to regulation is very much a second best for consumers. It is the lesser of two evils under the current statutory framework, and we do not believe that it gives appropriate scope for the work of the union solicitor, nor that it gives the right level of protection for the client and the public. Ensuring that a trade union that chooses to provide such reserved legal services through authorised employees is within the part 5 regime would perfect the current imperfect powers of the SRA and other approved regulators.
To give an example, based on experience, the SRA sets out what it hoped would be a rare, but possible, scenario. A trade union provides, through its in-house legal team, litigation and advocacy services relating to occupational disease cases. There is evidence that a union employee has written to members making claims, telling them precisely what to say to medical examiners, apparently whether true or not. It is not clear whether the in-house lawyers providing the litigation and advocacy services were aware of or complicit in the sending of the letters, or whether union officials were aware or whether it was simply the work of one employee. It goes without saying that writing such a letter in the context of litigation goes to the heart of upholding the proper administration of justice and is a serious matter.
If, in the example, the SRA regulated only the in-house solicitor and not the union, and the Bar Council regulated the in-house barrister, then any investigation would have to relate to that individual solicitor and barrister. Problems may arise in seeking information, documents and explanations from other employees or union officials to be able to get a complete picture of who was responsible for what. Any interview with others to help find out what the solicitor’s involvement was would largely voluntary.
If there was evidence that the solicitor was complicit, disciplinary action would be taken against the solicitor, which might result in the solicitor being struck off. That would take the solicitor out of the union, but would not prevent the union from continuing to provide reserved legal services through other authorised persons.
If an in-house barrister was also a member ofthe team, the Bar Standards Board would have to undertake a separate investigation into the conduct of that barrister. No action could be taken by the SRA or the Bar Standards Board against any union official or employee. They could not prevent the union from providing reserved legal activities through authorised employees.
If the SRA, or another licensing authority, regulated both the union’s legal activities and the lawyers, the powers of investigation under the part 5 regime would allow for a full investigation of all involved. There would be rights of access to all documents and rights to interview all employees. That would allow the SRA to determine appropriate responsibility. It could take disciplinary or regulatory action against the lawyers and it could take action in relation to non-lawyer employees and in relation to the union itself. If there were concerns about the union’s fitness to provide reserved legal services, its licence to provide those services could be withdrawn. The current situation is a disgraceful state of affairs and wholly without justification. I shall recommend that my hon. Friends vote against the amendment, with the aim that the Government have a rethink, but this time, I hope, with consultation.
In recent days, a group of concerned regulators has been asking the Minister for clarification on how such an unacceptable set-up would work in practice. I therefore end my comments with an excerpt from a letter that the president of the Law Society sent to the Minister three days ago, on 11 June. I shall not quote the whole letter, but just the key points, which state:
“the Government has proposed an amendment to the Bill which goes far beyond even what was discussed between officials. The Government’s amendment would exempt trade unions froma requirement to become an ABS...As you made clear on2nd Reading, trade unions will have to provide reserved services through qualified persons. As we read the amendments,the qualified persons concerned will remain fully subject to the regulatory requirements of their professional body. So if the SRA...concluded that the public interest required that lawyers should provide particular reserved legal services to trade union members only through a regulated environment, they could—as they can now—make rules to that effect. Any such rules would of course require the approval of the Legal Services Board, and so could only be made if there was a demonstrable regulatory need for them.
As we read the amendments, there is nothing to stop a trade union from becoming an ABS—or from establishing a separate, wholly owned vehicle which would itself become an ABS—in order to provide reserved legal services to members. Accordingly if regulators did conclude that lawyers employed by trade unions should provide particular reserved services to members only through a regulated entity, trade unions would readily be able to adapt to that, and continue to provide whatever legal services they wish to their members.”
 Now we are getting down to the nub of the situation. I would appreciate hearing whether the Minister agrees with what the Law Society said.
The Government need to be more transparent about their intentions, which remain opaque. If the intention is that the Bill should entrench trade unions’ ability to provide legal services to their members through lawyers without any need for regulation of the entity through which those services are provided, that would represent an unjustified special treatment of trade unions that would be contrary to the public and consumer interest and difficult to understand on any rational basis. If, however, the intention is simply to leave the questionof the extent to which trade unions’ legal services should be provided through a regulated entity to be determined by the structures established by the Bill, that would less problematic, although we should still like the Government to set out exactly what they propose.

Kevan Jones: Actually, I support the amendment. The hon. Member for Huntingdon has just shown his lack of understanding of how trade unions operate, although he has raised some points that I agree with, and which I should like the Minister to clarify. The way in which trade unions are organised is quite different from how commercial operations are organised. My experience, as someone who used to run legal services for a trade union, but who is not a legally qualified solicitor, is that most of the time, most trade unions employ lawyers and barristers to fight cases in courts and tribunals.
Sometimes, test cases are taken that the individual would not be able to fund without the support of the trade union. I sometimes used to wince when I had to sign cheques for expensive barristers, but on certain occasions they were well worth it, because of the amount of compensation in the test cases that they won and because the precedents set were important. In those cases, although a trade union is employing those solicitors, it will be covered by regulation. The unions are not exempt at all, and I would think that that would be the bulk of their work.
The other side of the matter is something that I do not think that it would be helpful to bring into legislation, and that is the advice given by the trade union in workplaces by lay representatives at internal disciplinary meetings and industrial tribunals. I usedto go to industrial tribunals every week, even thoughI was never legally qualified, unlike some of the esteemed barristers against whom I used to come up. I had a good strike rate, and beat a few of them.
There is an issue about in-house lawyers, and I need it clarifying in my own mind.
If they are a qualified lawyer, they will clearly be regulated, because they will be a member of the Law Society and will fall within the ambit of the regulation. My confusion is over whether a lawyer acting on behalf of a trade union and conducting work solely on behalf of that union is exempt as an individual. We need some clarification. I suspect that the answer is that they are not. If we are not careful, we could take regulation into areas where it would not help to bring access to justice for many people, nor good industrial relations.

John Hemming: The hon. Gentleman has experience of trade unions, and when he said that they frequently employ barristers I took that to mean that the barristers were employed by the trade unions as employees. He is saying now that the trade unions contract with solicitors who contract with self-employed barristers. There is no contract between the trade union and the barrister, not that that is particularly relevant. However, it is relevant that it would not even fall under regulated legal services because the trade union employees, acting for the trade union, might offer advice but would not conduct litigation or exercise a right of audience. The employees of the trade union would give that work to a firm of solicitors. The hon. Gentleman has more experience of trade union legal services than I do, so will he tell me whether there are any circumstances in which a trade union has an employee who is a barrister who goes to court to represent members of the trade union?

Kevan Jones: I do not speak on behalf of every trade union, but I have never been aware of a barrister who is employed directly by a trade union. What used to happen in the cases on which I used to engage barristers was that we got to know some of them quite well, so we would select them to do specialist work on specialist pieces of law. They were not employees of the union, but were engaged case by case. However, when unions have to deal with certain areas of industrial injury law, certainly, they employ the same barrister on quite a few occasions because they are usually the best for the job.
Another area that needs clarifying is what is defined as membership. The certification of an officer is weak. I do not want to over-regulate the sector, but, for example, people buy into so-called membership of Durham area NUM—they are associate members. They have no rights as a defined member, but pay £20 a year to access a legal service. The hon. Member for Huntingdon will wonder how they get redress, and I have got redress for them so far by going after the solicitors through the legal complaints service, to the great anger of the law firm in question as it has to pay the money out rather than the NUM. At the moment, that is how I can get justice for those members.

Jonathan Djanogly: Clearly, that leads to the question of whether it is fair that the solicitors have to pay for the union.

Kevan Jones: The answer is yes, because they should have known better than to enter into such a relationship with the NUM.
The canteen lady case and the Durham NUM case are useful in illustrating that a gap exists. If people have no trade union rights by means of which they can vote people out or have any say, where do they go? I support the exemption, but we need clarity on the meaning of membership.
Things can get a bit fuzzy in the area of the legal services that are provided for family members and in the definition of family members. Some trade unions have a wide definition, whereas others restrict the definition to spouses and immediate family. A related matter is that of the time when someone becomes a member. I am aware of cases in which people have joined a trade union to obtain legal services, even though the legal services started first and the people concerned might have stopped paying. Again, some clarity is needed.
However, union legal services are being extended, and I do not think for one minute that we should diminish the access to justice that they provide—at low cost to the public purse—to many thousands of people every year who otherwise would not have access to justice. The hon. Member for Huntingdon made a point about trade unions gathering steam. I can say from personal experience that, if a trade union gives bad legal advice, there is recourse for the individual to sue the trade union for negligence. In the case of my own union, such an action cost it quite a lot of money on one occasion. There are one or two routes that are open to individuals to obtain redress for bad advice, other than through certification officers.
I urge the Minister none the less to clarify the position on associate members, because that is an issue that could come back to haunt us, and I want to avoid situations in which we leave grey areas or loose ends that could discredit the great work done by the majority of trade unions.

John Hemming: I admit that my confusion remains, because it still appears to me to some extent that the debate on trade unions is about solving a problem that the Bill does not create. If the trade unions offer legal services, they are not regulated, although I agree that, if they offer regulated legal services, there is an issue. We have not identified any of the services that the unions offer.

Kevan Jones: The unions are regulated. The bulk of the work that I used to deal with was representational and was performed by barristers or qualified solicitors, and was therefore regulated. The other large element of work was in industrial injury cases, for which I believe most trade unions do not employ in-house lawyers, but use contracted-out services. There is a whole host of activities that will be regulated by the Bill.

John Hemming: They are regulated, but the important point, and the reason why the people to whom the hon. Gentleman referred could sue the solicitors, was because the clients of those solicitors were the union members rather than the union. The union might pay money and underwrite cases, particularly for test cases, and that is right. The union might underwrite a test case because an individual member might not be able to afford the cost. However, the actual client of the solicitors’ firm would be the union member rather than the union.
Litigation involves signing documents, such as claim forms and so on. The claim form can be signed by a litigant in person or by a solicitor on behalf of his client. I am not aware that a trade union can currently sign a claim form on behalf of a union member. It can sign one on behalf of itself, but not on a member’s behalf, and to that extent the litigation that is initiated by a member is not being conducted by the union. There are issues around case management and claims management, and where the responsibility for that should lie, but that is probably not within the ambit of the Bill.
I have a certain amount of experience of working with trade unions, for instance in employment representation matters involving Unison. Unison might customarily go into internal disputes in which there is a hearing in a city council or some other organisation. That is not regulated. That is not legal advice. It is not a right of audience because it is an internal matter. It may then go to an employment tribunal. That is not a court. There are no rights of audience; people can turn up and do their own thing. There is no difficulty. Because individuals are not exercising a right of audience and the person who initiates the claim at the employment tribunal is, to a great extent, the member of the trade union, it is not a regulated legal service. Such an issue is a legal service, but not a regulated legal service.
We must get something good from the Bill. I entirely agree that the work done at a lower level by convenors, shop stewards and the like in advising people is not something over which we need a complex regulatory process. Let us consider the Middlesbrough case when the trade union was sued for settling on an equal pay claim. That raises an issue about collective bargaining and whether the law and way in which it has evolved has undermined it as a way forward. There are great difficulties with such matters, but they do not fall within the ambit of the Bill.

Kevan Jones: I know that case well. The individual trade union member did not consider that they had received good legal advice from the trade union, and was out to get recourse by suing the trade union.

John Hemming: Yes. In other words, that was advice. It was not a regulated legal service. It was a legal service and thus would not fall within the ambit of the Bill. The reality is that any sensible trade union should have a form of negligence insurance to handle claims against it in respect of the advice that its people give.
The Middlesbrough case was about an equal pay claim, which is a major issue in many urban areas specifically in respect of local authorities. Such cases have many complications, but they involve a legal service that is not regulated, so they would not come under the Bill. If we are trying to solve a problem through the amendments, we must be clear about what the problem is in the first instance. Will writing is not one such example, but the amendments would create a situation in which we could ask the trade union to undertake a conveyancing job. Theoretically, the amendments require that and want matters done through an individual rather than through an organisational agreement.

Kevan Jones: The trade union for which I worked did conveyancing, but we used to give such matters to a qualified law firm that did it on behalf of the member. The law firm would therefore be regulated underthe Bill.

John Hemming: Exactly. If we give the work to a law firm to handle, it would not come under the Bill and the member is the client of the law firm. Organisations, such as the Federation of Small Businesses, have a legal insurance scheme. A certain amount is paid after which it will send people to lawyers for advice. The federation would not be worried by the fact that it would suddenly have to be regulated and authorised because the Bill will not change anything. In essence, a deal is done with various lawyers—insurance-type schemes and the like—the end result of which works reasonably well.
The reality is that trade unions do not offer regulated legal services at present, as defined under the Bill. Regulated legal services are provided by firms of lawyers. Trade unions may pay them as a third-party payment, but they are not providing the legal services themselves.

Jonathan Djanogly: The hon. Gentleman is making a good point, but a trade union can offer regulated services itself. It could well employ an in-house solicitor who would carry out the work effectively in the trade union’s name, but only the in-house solicitor could be regulated.

John Hemming: I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. I am talking about what happens at the moment and those with the most experience of running legal services. As the hon. Member for North Durham said, usually they use a firm of solicitors. No one is saying that such matters should move in-house. We have not identified the problem that we are trying to solve, yet we are generating statute to solve the problem. People may go to the union in the hope that it will pay for some legal services for them, but the union does not, as a rule, provide regulated legal services.
Without question, legal services are provided by many people. They are provided informally by convenors, and there are issues about negligence and being able to sue the union for duff advice and so on. Support is offered at all levels of employment disputes, and that would not fall within the provision. We must consider what problem we are trying to solve and how it is defined in the Bill, before considering amendments.

John Mann: Let me explain the problem as simply as possible. The Opposition’s opposition to the exemption misses the point because they have not fully understood the situation and the key principles, nor has the Law Society. I shall speak about the Law Society’s lengthy advice, not least because the case cited is one that I initiated some time ago, so I know it well.
If a union takes on a case for a group of workers against an employer for industrial injury, it can be handled in two ways. One is to have a lawyer, as defined by everyone and in the Bill, to do the work—forget in-house and external, because that is not the point. A legal professional could handle it. The second way is for someone like me to handle it by putting the case to the employer and negotiating. I would explain that a group of employees have industrial deafness, I would have them medically tested, I would demonstrate causation by the employer, and I would try to negotiate a settlement with the employer. The advantage for the employer is that the legal costs will not be high, and the advantage for the individual members is that they will not run the risk, individually or through their union, of adverse court costs.
The latter way can be sensible and in this country we call it industrial relations. They normally work, but if it is impossible to agree, some cases may go throughthe legal process as test cases, with solicitors and, if necessary, barristers on both sides fighting the case. That is all covered. The issue is that the industrial relations side is not covered, nor should it be.
The amendments seem to be sensible, but on the question of where the individual union member should go, the answer seems to be straightforward. If I negotiate on their behalf, the remedies should be clear, and it would be helpful if the certification officer could quantify them. It would not seem sensible from anyone’s point of view for the Law Society to regulate my industrial relations negotiations—even if I was acting, in essence, in lieu of a solicitor, because that was the sanction under which I negotiated. That is commonplace industrial relations practice.
There is no suggestion that the Law Society should regulate any of that activity, but unions call people different things. The union could give me the title, “law officer”. If one is a solicitor, one is covered, as I understand the Bill; and if one is not, and one is not performing one of the reserved legal activities, which is the key point, the situation is clear. It is importantthat the certification officer is given clear guidance, because the role currently seems rather too woolly. With respect to the hon. Member for Huntingdon, that course would have been the more obvious one to take in order to achieve what he has attempted with the Bill.
Who knows what mood his party leader is in today on those issues, but I fear that the hon. Member for Huntingdon is trying to presume his party’s position on trade unions, and that he oversells the case, because the vast majority of the unions are not and never have been affiliated to the Labour party. Fifteen unions are affiliated, and only two have become unaffiliated inthe past 40 years. However, there are probably 70 or80 other unions in the TUC, and their number is increasing mainly through specialist, professional unions, which have nothing to do with the Labour party either institutionally or in any other way.
 John Hemming rose—

Michael Foster: On a point of order, Mr. Cook, I beg to move that the sitting be now adjourned.

Frank Cook: The hon. Gentleman cannot move the Adjournment on an intervention. Has the hon. Member for Bassetlaw finished his speech?

John Mann: I have.
Debate adjourned.—[Mr. Foster.]

Adjourned accordingly at twenty-two minutes past Four o’clock till Tuesday 19 June at half-past Ten o’clock.